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PROPOSALS - ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING
civil liberties. We cannot insist on the strict enforcement of laws relating to
gambling, narcotics and prostitution on the one hand, and then proceed to
paralyze the very agencies that must enforce these laws. Either we give law en-
forcement agencies the power to enforce the laws properly or we should forget
about their enforcement.
H. Citizen crime commissions should be organized in every large com-
munity in order to keep close watch on local law enforcement.
An aroused public opinion is a necessary basis for the enforcement of
gambling, prostitution and narcotics laws. Such a public opinion would, in
the first instance, prevent the election of officials who are beholden to the
interests of organized crime. It would demand that sheriffs, police officers and
prosecuting attorneys do something about the open violation of state laws. It
would not be impressed with the failure of the police to find violations of gam-
bling laws and prostitution laws which are known to any taxi driver or man
about town. It would not be taken in by the myth propagated by gamblers and
owners of houses of prostitution, as to the benefits resulting from the so-called
"open town." It would not accept the "pay-off" as a necessary fact of official
and police life.
One of the instruments by which a community can be aroused to de-
mand decent law enforcement is the Citizens' Crime Commission. In the past
such crime commissions, in places like Chicago, Miami, New Orleans and New
York, have done yeoman service in combatting organized crime and in keep-
ing the public informed concerning the activities of law enforcement agencies.
Such watchdog commissions are vital in every community. Unfortunately they
have too frequently been organized after a crisis in law enforcement and have
been allowed to die after the crisis has passed. Adequately financed and sup-
ported crime commissions in every large city can go a long way toward keep-
ing our cities clean of the menace of organized crime.
Conclusion.
As we have indicated, there are no simple solutions or simple panaceas
for the evils of organized crime. We have examined some new and old ap-
proaches to this age-old American problem. Organized crime requires all the
effort and all the attention that courts, law enforcement agencies and an aroused
citizenry can muster.
4. ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING
by Richard C. Donnelly
An urgent problem of our time is the harmonization of man's mastery over
nature with freedom and human dignity. The quest for omnipotence poses the
question of the peril in which traditional respect for privacy stands in the
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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modem world. Should privacy be abandoned altogether or should we at-
tempt to salvage as much as possible from what is perhaps a sinking ship?
Privacy is threatened on two fronts. One is the intensity with which cer-
tain demands for invasion are generated. Scientific and technological develop-
ments become irrevocable traits of the culture - however difficult and vexatious
are the resulting problems of assimilation and adjustment. Privacy is threatened,
secondly, by the phenomenal but frightening increase in scientific and technical
knowledge about how it can be invaded. Modem science and invention have
developed a host of means for penetrating the traditional zones of privacy.
Thirty-five years ago Mr. Justice Brandeis made this prophecy:
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways
may some day be developed by which the Government, without re-
moving papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court,
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home. Advances in the psychic and related
sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts
and emotions .... Can it be that the Constitution affords no protec-
tion against such invasions of individual security?'
Today we have parabolic microphones that can beam in on conversations
from hundreds of feet away. Resonator radio transmitters the size of match
boxes can be planted under a table or bed to send conversations to receiving
sets a mile away. Telephone tap connections no longer need be made by crude
wire-splicing. Tapping can be done by refined induction coil devices and even
by metallic conductor paints applied close to the telephone connection and
matched to the wall color to defy detection. Tape recorders small enough to
fit into a coat pocket have been invented as have "television eyes" small enough
to be hidden in a heating duct or light fixture. Tiny automatic cameras are able
to photograph in the dark with infrared film.'
These developments, as well as others in the behavioral sciences, portend
a time when all private thoughts and feelings will be vulnerable to disclosure.
When this day arrives, privacy, from a scientific and technical point of view,
will be a thing of the past.
Given the cold war, the continual rise in the crime rate, and the pervasive-
ness of organized crime, the burden of surveillance and detection put upon
police agencies is unusually heavy. There are strong inducements and pressures
to utilize these instruments of permeation.
THE PRESENT SITUATION
The emergence of organized crime during the Prohibition Era stimulated
extensive wiretapping. It was during this period - in 1928 - that the United
States Supreme Court made its first pronouncement on the subject. In Olmstead
v. United States' the evidence disclosed "a conspiracy of amazing magnitude
1 Ohnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928).
2 DASH, KNOWLTON, AND SCHWARTZ, The Eavesdroppers 373 (1959). Also see, WESTIN,
Wiretapping: The Quiet Revolution, 29 Commentary 333 (1960).
3 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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to import, possess and sell liquor unlawfully."4 The information leading to the
discovery of the conspiracy and its operations was largely obtained by wire-
tapping carried on for many months by federal officers. Small wires were in-
serted along the ordinary telephone lines from the residence of four of the
defendants and also those leading from the central business office. The insertions
were made without trespass upon any property of the defendants. They were
made in the streets near the residences and in the basement of the office building
where the central business office was located.
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, sustained a conviction
based, for the most part, on the wiretap evidence. Mr. Chief Justice Taft ruled
that tapping was not an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning
of the fourth amendment. He emphasized that the tappers had seized nothing
tangible nor had they trespassed.
The Amendment does not forbid what was done here. There
was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured
by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no
entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.-
The Chief Justice continued:
The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a tele-
phone instrument with connecting wires intends to project his
voice to those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his house
and messages while passing over them are not within the protection
of the Fourth Amendment. Here those who intercepted the projected
voices were not in the house of either party to the conversation. 6
Justices Brandeis, Butler, Stone and Holmes dissented - the latter on
nonconstitutional grounds. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in a famous tribute to privacy,
found violations of both the fourth and fifth amendments. In adopting these
amendments, he said:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signifi-
cance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
... They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceed-
ing, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation
of the Fifth.7
Also, it was immaterial to him where the federal officers made the physical con-
nection with the telephone wires leading into the defendants' premises.
Although the Court has been urged on several occasions to overrule the
Olmstead case and several Justices, such as Murphy, Frankfurter, and Douglas,
have been willing to do so, a majority has never been assembled. The case
still stands for the proposition that off the premises wiretapping is not within
the fourth amendment. There is one aspect of the opinion, however, that is no
4 Id. at 455-56.
5 Id. at 464.
6 Id. at 466.
7 Id. at 478.
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longer the law, namely, that only tangible matter is subject to seizure. In Wong
Sun v. United States,8 a non-eavesdropping case decided last January, the
Court said:
The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physi-
cal, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result
of, an unlawful invasion. It follows from our holding in Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 . . . , that the Fourth Amendment
may protect against the overhearing of verbal statement as well
as against the more traditional seizure of "papers and effects."
... Nor do the policies underlying the exclusionary rule invite any
logical distinction between physical and verbal evidence. Either
in terms of deterring lawless conduct by federal officers . . . or of
closing the doors of the federal courts to any use of evidence
unconstitutionally obtained... the danger in relaxing the exclusion-
ary rules in the case of verbal evidence would seem too great to
warrant introducing such a distinction.9
With the passage of the Federal Communications Act of 1934,1" the plane
of legal controversy moved from the constitutional to the statutory level. This
act purported to re-enact the Radio Act of 1927, to make it applicable to wire
communication, and to transfer control to the newly formed Federal Com-
munications Conmmission. Included in the Act was Section 605, the pertinent
clauses of which are as follows:
. ..and no person not being authorized by the sender shall
intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted
communication to any person; and no person not being entitled
thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio and use the same or any informa-
tion therein contained for his own benefit or the benefit of another
not being entitled thereto; and no person having received such inter-
cepted communication or having be.come acquainted with the con-
tents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, knowing that such information was so obtained, shall divulge
or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or use the same or any
information therein contained for his own benefit or for the benefit
of another not entitled thereto: .... 1
In addition, Section 501 of the Act imposes a fine or imprisonment or both
for wilful and knowing violations of its provisions.12
The first case before the Supreme Court involving Section 605 came in
1937. In Nardone v. United States," it was decided that direct wiretap evidence
obtained by federal agents was inadmissible in federal criminal trials. Two
years later the Nardone case was before the Court again' and the "fruit of
8 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963).
9 Id. at 416.
10 Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified in ii U.S.C., 15 U.S.C. and scattered sections
of 47 U.S.C.).
11 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958).
12 48 Stat. 1100 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 501 (1958).
13 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
14 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
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the poisonous tree" doctrine was applied to exclude evidence obtained from
wiretap leads. At the same term the Nardone doctrine was extended to intrastate
as well as interstate telephone conversations."5
As of 1939, then, the Supreme Court had construed Section 605 as em-
bracing a congressional intention to protect telephone privacy - excluding
from the federal courts wiretap evidence obtained directly or derivatively from
either interstate or intrastate calls. Nevertheless, the situation today is most
unsatisfactory and telephone users are not protected from wiretapping by either
police officers or private persons." There are several reasons for this state of
affairs.
In 1941, Attorney General Jackson announced the surprising position
that the Department of Justice considered itself an autonomy." Consequently,
divulgence of wiretapped conversations within the Department is not a di-
vulgence within the meaning of Section 605. Although this view has never
been exposed to a legal test, it is still endorsed by the Justice Department. The
interpretation finesses the literal language of the statute which forbids publica-
tion to "any person." Also, it seems contrary to the holding in the second
Nardone case, which adopted the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Why
should evidence obtained by wiretap leads be inadmissible under Section 605
unless the original interception and divulgence are a violation?'"
Furthermore, the interpretation of the Department of Justice contradicts the
"use for benefit" clauses of Section 605. It has been argued that this phrase
means a use for personal advantage of monetary gain only: that a use for law
enforcement purposes is not forbidden.' The question has never been decided
by the Supreme Court. Three dissenting justices in Goldstein v. United States,20
however, responded to the question as follows:
There is no merit in the Government's contention that the un-
equivocal language of the "use for benefit" clause should be con-
strued as condemning only such uses as are designed to result in
some monetary or other similar benefit of a private nature, for the
prohibitions of § 605 are applicable to the Government and its of-
ficers, as well as to private persons .... The prohibition in this last
clause of § 605 by Congress of the "use' of outlawed evidence is
so unequivocal and controlling that the failure of the court below
even to refer to this clause can only be explained on the assumption
that it was overlookedY'
The Department of Justice has also taken the position that Section 605
forbids interception and divulgence, not interception alone." This interpretation
15 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
16 The literature on wiretapping is overwhelming. For a selective bibliography see PAULSEN
AND KADISH, Criminal Law and its Processes 900 (1962).
17 Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R.
2266 and H.R. 3099, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1941). See also, Donnelly, Comments and
Caveats on the Wire Tapping Controversy, 63 YALE L.J. 799, 800 n. 7 (1954).
18 MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 144 (1959).
19 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
20 316 U.S. 114, 122 (1942).
21 Id. at 125.
22 Kennedy, Attorney General's Opinion on Wiretaps, The New York Times Magazine,
June 3, 1962, p. 21. See also, Donnelly, Comments and Caveats on the Wire Tapping Con-
troversy, 63 YALE L.J. 799, 800 (1954).
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is disputable. Language in both Nardone cases suggests that the prohibition ap-
plies to wiretapping alone as well as divulgence. Moreover, recent opinions of
the Court carefully note the issue as unsettled. In Benanti v. United States,2"
the Court wrote:
Because both an interception and a divulgence are present in
this case we need not decide whether both elements are necessary
for a violation of § 605.... 24
The first divulgence appearing on the record occurred in
court, but we do not mean to imply that an out-of-court violation
of the statute would not also lead to the invalidation of a sub-
sequent conviction.
2 5
And in Rathbun v. United States26 the Court remarked:
We do not decide the question of whether § 605 is violated
where a message is intercepted but not divulged since the police
officers did divulge the contents of the overheard conversation when
they testified in court.
2 7
By these two readings of the legislation, i.e., (1) there must be both in-
terception and divulgence before Section 605 is violated and (2) interdepart-
mental communication is not a divulgence, the Department has convinced itself
that its wiretapping activities are within the law until someone outside the De-
partment is told about the intercepted message or its contents.
Another difficulty is the proper construction of the clause of Section 605
requiring the authorization of the "sender" before the "interception" is lawful.
Two questions emerge. Who is a sender and is the use, for example, of an ex-
tension telephone, an interception? Judge Hand dealt with the matter in this
fashion:
The word, "sender," in § 605 is less apt for a telephone
talk than a telegram. . . . [E]ach party is alternately sender and
receiver and it would deny all significance to the privilege created
by § 605 to hold that because one party originated the call he had
power to surrender the other's privilege. . . . [A]nyone intercepts
a message to whose intervention as a listener the communicants
do not consent; the means he employs can have no importance; it
is the breach of privacy that counts.
28
A conflict in the lower federal courts regarding this problem, prompted
the Supreme Court to undertake its resolution in Rathbun v. United States.29
The case involved a prosecution for transmitting an interstate message threaten-
ing murder. The police, with the consent of the person threatened, listened in
on a regularly used extension telephone and utilized the substance of the con-
versation as evidence. The Court held this not to violate Section 605. Mr. Chief
Justice Warren, after commenting upon the wide use of telephone extensions in
home and office, referred to the "use for benefit" clause of Section 605.
23 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
24 Id. at 100 n. 5.
25 Id. at 102 n. 9.
26 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
27 Id. at 108 n. 3.
28 United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888, 889 (2d Cir. 1940).
29 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
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The clear inference is that one entitled to receive the communica-
tion may use it for his own benefit or have another use it for him.
The communication itself is not privileged, and one party may not
force the other to secrecy merely by using a telephone. It has been
conceded by those who believe the conduct here violates § 605 that
either party may record the conversation and publish it. The con-
duct of the party would differ in no way if instead of repeating
the message he held out his handset so that another could hear out
of it. We see no distinction between that sort of action and per-
mitting an outsider to use an extension telephone for the same
purpose....
Common experience tells us that a call to a particular tele-
phone number may cause the bell to ring in more than one ordi-
narily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation takes
the risk that the other party may have an extension telephone and
may allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes
place there has been no violation of any privacy of which the
parties may complain. Consequently, one element of § 605, inter-
ception, has not occurred.30
Justices Frankfurter and Douglas dissented. To them "intercept" is synony-
mous with "listen in." It means "an intrusion by way of listening to the legally
insulated transmission of thought between a speaker and a hearer."3 1 By "sender"
they apparently mean the person placing the call.
Since this Court, in Nardone, read "no person" to mean no
person, it is even more incumbent to construe "sender" to mean
sender, as was the petitioner here, and not to read "sender" to
mean one of the parties to the communication, whether sender
or receiver.
32
The Rathbun case raises a number of questions. Suppose the defendant,
instead of placing the call, receives it? Does it make any difference whether the
extension is installed at the suggestion of the police solely for the purp6se of the
eavesdrop? Is it of any legal consequence that instead of a telephone extension,
a tap in the usual sense of the word is used? Suppose the eavesdrop is accom-
plished not by the human ear but by a recording device operated either by one
of the parties to the call or by a third person having his permission?33
In United States v. Williams,' the 7th Circuit recently answered these
questions in the negative.
Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the
other party may allow another to overhear conversation .... That
such eavesdropping is accomplished with the aid of a tape recorder
(connected to an induction coil), as here used, does not serve to
distinguish Rathbun. 5
Still another problem in construing "interception" appears in eavesdropping
situations where an electronic device requiring no direct contact with telephone
equipment is used. Generally, where a police officer listens without the aid of
30 Id. at 110.
31 Id. at 113.
32 Id. at 113.
33 Bradley and Hogan, Wiretapping: From Nardone to Benanti and Rathbun, 46 GEo.
L.J. 418, 436 (1958).
34 311 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1963).
35 Id. at 725. (Material in parentheses added.)
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an extension or wiretap device, Section 605 is not violated and the communi-
cation is admissible in evidence, unless there has been trespass in the installa-
tion of the equipment. This is so even though the consent of neither party is
obtained. Goldman v. United States6 is the leading case on this point. There,
an electronic device known as a detectaphone was placed against a partition
wall. It picked up what was said on the telephone as well as other conversa-
tions. The Court held there was no interception within the meaning of the
statute. Mr. Justice Roberts expressed the view that if the listening in occurred
at either end of the telephone line, there was no interception.
As has rightly been held, this word (intercept) indicates the taking
or seizure by the way or before arrival at the destined place. It
does not ordinarily connote the obtaining of what is to be sent be-
fore, or at the moment, it leaves the possession of the proposed
sender, or after, or at the moment, it comes into the possession of
the intended receiver.at
Finally, the Supreme Court's treatment of the impact of Section 605 up-
on state wiretapping practices has resulted in an unsavory situation. A majority
of the states have some sort of wiretapping legislation which Mr. Samuel Dash
has classified as "permissive," "prohibition" and "virgin.
38
In Schwartz v. Texas,39 the Court had the question of whether Section
605 forbids the use of wiretap evidence in a state criminal proceeding. It was
held
... that § 605 applies only to the exclusion in federal court pro-
ceedings of evidence obtained and sought to be divulged in violation
thereof; it does not exclude such evidence in state court proceedings.
Since we do not believe that Congress intended to impose a rule
of evidence on the state courts, we do not decide whether it has
the power to do so.4°
The Court pointed out that while the statute had been violated, this was
"simply an additional factor for a state to consider in formulating a rule of
evidence for use in its own courts."'
Five years later in Benanti v. United States," the issue was whether evidence
derived from a wiretap interception by state officers, without participation by
federal authorities, was admissible in a federal court. New York police officers
had obtained a warrant in accordance with state law authorizing them to tap
the wires of a bar which the defendant was known to frequent. It was ruled
that a correct application of the Nardone principle "dictates that evidence ob-
tained by means forbidden by Section 605, whether by state or federal agents,
36 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
37 Id. at 134. (Material in parentheses added.) This formalistic reasoning has been fol-
lowed in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 129 (1954) and Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505 (1961).
38 DASH, KNOWLTON AND SCHWARTZ, The Eavesdroppers 35, 161, 231 (1959). See also,
Comment, Wiretapping: The State Law, 57 J. CRm. LAW C. & P.C. 534 (1961).
39 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
40 Id. at 203.
41 Id. at 201.
42 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
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is inadmissible in federal court."4 3 The Court distinguished Schwartz as in-
volving a state court and state law enforcement officers.
The rationale of that case is that despite the plain prohibition of
Section 605, due regard to federal-state relations precluded the con-
clusion that Congress intended to thwart a state rule of evidence
in the absence of a clear indication to that effect. In the instant
case we are not dealing with a state rule of evidence. Although state
agents committed the wiretap, we are presented with a federal con-
viction brought about in part by a violation of federal law, in this
case in a federal court. 44
But the Court's opinion is much broader than its holding:
[The] Federal Communications Act is a comprehensive scheme
for the regulation of interstate communication .... [H]ad Congress
intended to allow the States to make exceptions to Section 605, it
would have said so. In light of the above considerations, and keeping
in mind this comprehensive scheme of interstate regulation and
the public policy underlying Section 605 as part of that scheme, we
find that Congress, setting out a prohibition in plain terms, did not
mean to allow state legislation which would contradict that sec-
tion and that policy.:5
After the Benanti decision, federal and state courts were placed in a
quandary as to the status of state rules of evidence permitting the use of wire-
tap evidence. The Supreme Court had clearly stated that admission of evidence
in a state court contrary to Section 605 constitutes a federal crime. Implied in
that decision was an intolerance of state rules of admissibility. The Schwartz
and Benanti cases thus put the trial judge in a state admitting wiretap evidence
in the unsavory dilemma of either allowing a federal crime to be committed in
his court and in his presence or of not following the state's rule of evidence.
Unfortunately, this dilemma was not resolved in Pugach v. Dollinger."6
Pugach had been indicted by a New York grand jury for several serious crimes.
The indictment was based in part upon information obtained by wiretapping
conducted in accordance with state law. Pugach sought to enjoin the District
Attorney and others "from proceeding . . . upon the indictments . . . on any
grounds in which they may use wire tapping evidence, or on any grounds
or investigations resulting from or instituted as a result of the aforesaid illegal
wire taps. '4 7 Relief was denied by the Federal District Court, affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, and affirmed per curiam by the Supreme Court. A ma-
jority of the Court relied, in part, upon the Schwartz case. Mr. Justice Douglas
and the Chief Justice dissented. They would have overruled Schwartz. It should
be noted that the Pugach case merely refused an injunction in advance of trial.
Whether a state conviction based upon wiretap evidence would be reversed
was left open.
At this point an analogy to search and seizures is apropos. In the first
Nardone case, Mr. Justice Roberts suggested that the considerations moving
Congress to adopt Section 605 were the same that evoked the guaranty against
43 Id. at 100
44 Id. at 101-02.
45 Id. at 104-06.
46 365 U.S. 458 (1961).
47 Id. at 461.
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practices and procedures violative of privacy embodied in the fourth and fifth
amendments of the Constitution. Section 605 thus confers a statutory right
of privacy equivalent to the constitutional right of privacy conferred by the
fourth amendment. In 1949 in Wolf v. Colorado,48 the Supreme Court held
that unreasonable searches and seizures by state law enforcement officers vio-
late the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. However, the states
were not required to adopt the exclusionary rule. In 1960, in Elkins v. United
States,.49 the Court ruled evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search and
seizure conducted by state officers without federal participation inadmissible
in a federal court. Then, in 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio,5" the Court overruled the
Wolf case in part, and held evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and
seizure inadmissible in both federal and state courts.
Will the Court next overrule Schwartz and hold that Section 605 forbids
the admission of wiretap evidence in state courts? It recently had an opportunity
to resolve this question in a case arising in New York. In People v. Dinan,51
the New York Court of Appeals held that wiretap evidence obtained pursuant
to court order was admissible in a state court prosecution notwithstanding the
fact it was obtained in violation of Section 605. It was argued by the defendants
that, by analogy, the Mapp case had overruled Schwartz. The New York court
divided four to three, the majority saying:
The identical result does not necessarily follow in case of
divulging telephone conversations in violation of section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act, inasmuch as a statute may not possess
the sanction of a constitutional inhibition protecting against fun-
damental rights granting immunity from unreasonable search and
seizure.
52
The minority felt that irrespective of whether or not Mapp applied the
evidence should not be admissible. This is so in order "to avoid commission




Unfortunately, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Justice Douglas dis-
senting."
So far, wiretapping, a specialized form of eavesdropping, has been stressed,
as the federal statute as well as most state statutes are limited to it. Eavesdrop-
ping with modem electronic devices is a far newer and far graver problem
than wiretapping. One can guard against the wiretap by not using the phone.
The seriousness of the issue is well illustrated by the facts in Irvine v. California.5
Irvine was suspected of violating the California gambling laws. On December
1, 1951, while Irvine and his wife were absent from their home, a police officer
arranged to have a locksmith go there and make a door key. Two days later,
again in the absence of occupants, officers and a technician entered the home
48 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
49 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
50 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
51 N.Y.2d 350, 183 N.E.2d 689, 229 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1962), remittitur amended, 11
N.Y.2d 1057, 184 N.E.2d 184, 230 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1962). People v. Dinan is noted in 63
COLum. L. REv. 369 (1963). See also, Williams v. Ball, 294 F.2d 94, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1961).
52 People v. Dinan at 183 N.E.2d 690.
53 Id. at 691.
54 People v. Dinan, 371 U.S. 877 (1962), cert. denied.
55 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
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by the use of this key and installed a concealed microphone in the hall. A hole
was bored in the roof of the house and wires were strung to transmit to a neigh-
boring garage whatever sounds the microphone might pick up. Officers were
posted in the garage to listen. On December 8, police again made surreptitious
entry and moved the microphone, this time hiding it in the bedroom. Twenty
days later they again entered and placed the microphone in a closet, where the
device remained until its purpose of enabling the officers to overhear incrim-
inating statements was accomplished. None of these repeated entries was with
a search warrant. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on the basis
of Wolf v. Colorado." Although a contrary result would now be reached under
Mapp v. Ohio,"' the case does illustrate the use and abuse of these modem
devices.
Whether there is an unconstitutional search and seizure when electronic
devices are used depends upon whether there was a trespass in their installation.
This doctrine goes back to Goldman v. United States58 where a detectaphone
was placed against a partition wall. The petitioners there sought to distinguish
Olmstead on the ground that one who talks in his own office intends his con-
versation to be confined within the four walls of the room and does not as-
sume the risk of someone's eavesdropping as he does when using the tele-
phone. The Court thought the distinction "too nice for practical application
of the Constitutional guarantee. . . .,,"
Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting, agreed there was no physical entry -
But the search of one's home or office no longer requires physical
entry, for science has brought forth far more effective devices for
the invasion of a person's privacy than the direct and obvious
methods of oppression which were detested by our forebears and
which inspired the Fourth Amendment. Surely the spirit motivating
the framers of that Amendment would abhor these new devices no
less. Physical entry may be wholly immaterial. Whether the search
of private quarters is accomplished by placing on the outer walls
of the sanctum a detectaphone that transmits to the outside listener
the intimate details of a private conversation, or by new methods
of photography that penetrate walls or overcome distances, the
privacy of the citizen is equally invaded by agents of the Government
and intimate personal matters are laid bare to view. Such invasions
of privacy, unless they are authorized by a warrant issued in the
manner and form prescribed by the Amendment, or otherwise
conducted under adequate safeguards defined by statute, are at one
with the evils which have heretofore been held to be within the
Fourth Amendment, and equally call for remedial action.60
In On Lee v. United States,6 an informer had entered On Lee's laundry
and engaged him in a conversation. Unbeknown to On Lee, there was a small
radio transmitter concealed upon the informer which broadcast their discussion
to Lee, a government agent, some distance away. No recording was made of
56 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
57 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
58 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
59 Id. at 135.
60 Id. at 139-40.
61 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
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the conversation but the agent was allowed to testify as to the contents of
the purported conversation. The majority of the Court first held there was no
trespass, stating that "the further contention of petitioner that agent Lee, out-
side the laundry, was a trespasser, because by these aids he overheard what went
on inside verges on the frivolous. ' '" 2 The Court then continued:
The presence of a radio set is not sufficient to suggest more than
the most attenuated analogy to wiretapping. Petitioner was talking
confidentially and indiscreetly with one he trusted, and he was
overheard. This was due to aid from a transmitter and receiver, to
be sure, but with the same effect on his privacy as if agent Lee had
been eavesdropping outside an open window. The use of bifocals,
field glasses or the telescope to magnify the object of a witness'
vision is not a forbidden search or seizure, even if they focus with-
out his knowledge or consent upon what one supposes to be private
indiscretions. It would be a dubious service to the genuine liberties
protected by the Fourth Amendment to make them bedfellows with
spurious liberties improvised by farfetched analogies which would
liken eavesdropping on a conversation, with the connivance of one
of the parties, to an unreasonable search or seizure.
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Justice Burton dissented and would make the test of a fourth amendment vio-
lation depend upon where the words are picked up.
Lee's overhearing of petitioner's statements was accomplished
through Chin Poy's surreptitious introduction, within petitioner's
laundry, of Lee's concealed radio transmitter which, without peti-
tioner's knowledge or consent, there picked up petitioner's conversa-
tion and transmitted it to Lee outside the premises. The presence
of the transmitter, for this purpose, was the presence of Lee's ear.
While this test draws a narrow line between what is admissible and
what is not, it is a clearly ascertainable line. It is determined by
where the "effects" are seized or, as here, where the words are
picked up. In this case the words were picked upon without war-
rant or consent within the constitutionally inviolate "house" of a
person entitled to protection there against unreasonable searches
and seizures of his person, house, papers and effects."-'
In Silverman v. United States,65 a "spike mike" was used by the police.
This instrument consisted of a microphone with a spike attached to it, together
with an amplifier, a power pack, and earphones. The spike was driven into a
wall until it made contact with a heating duct, which converted the entire heat-
ing system into a conductor of sound. The Supreme Court unanimously held
this conduct a violation of the fourth amendment. Mr. Justice Stewart em-
phasized that "eavesdropping was accompanied by means of an unauthorized
physical penetration into the premises occupied by the petitioners." 6 He con-
cluded that "decision here does not turn upon the technicality of a trespass upon
a party wall as a matter of local law. It is based upon the reality of an actual
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area."6
62 Id. at 752.
63 Id. at 753-54.
64 Id. at 766-67.
65 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
66 Id. at 509.
67 Id. at 512.
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Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, thought this limitation misconceived.
The depth of the penetration of the electronic device - even
the degree of its remoteness from the inside of the house - is not
the measure of the injury. There is in each such case a search that
should be made, if at all, only on a warrant issued by a magistrate.68
He continued that "the command of the Fourth Amendment" should not
"be limited by nice distinctions turning on the kind of electronic equipment
employed. Rather our sole concern should be with whether the privacy of the
home was invaded.""
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
Most responsible observers agree that, notwithstanding federal and state
legislation, wiretapping is carried on virtually unimpeded in the United States
today. The present situation is entirely unsatisfactory, if not chaotic, and cor-
rective measures are needed now. Three approaches to the problem have been
suggested. The first is that eavesdropping and wiretapping be recognized as a
search and seizure. As matters now stand, under the Olmstead, Goldman and
Silverman cases, the safeguards of the fourth and fourteenth amendments do
not include protection against electronic eavesdropping unless there is a trespass
or "an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area." But even if in-
vasion of privacy, however accomplished, be made the test of constitutional
inclusion, many problems would remain. The fourth amendment prohibits
"unreasonable searches and seizures" and requires that a warrant be based upon
probable cause and that it describe "the place to be searched, and . . . things
to be seized."" Can an eavesdropping search and seizure ever be reasonable?
Is it possible to describe the "things to be seized"? In other words, is eavesdrop-
ping such a drastic interference with privacy that it is constitutionally imper-
missible even under a search warrant?
The Supreme Court has held that objects of "evidentiary value only" can
never be seized even though an otherwise valid search warrant has been issued
for the objects and a properly conducted search has taken place.71 There is
probably nothing more purely evidentiary than an intercepted conversation.
Eavesdropping is unavoidably a hunt for evidence, for incriminating admissions.
In addition, it is impossible to forecast when an incriminating admission will
be made. The hunt may continue for weeks as contrasted with the specific and
limited temporal authority granted by the ordinary search warrant for tangible
things.
Eavesdropping, no matter how strict and careful the controls, is more in-
trusive than a search for tangibles for the additional reason that the subject
is unlikely to know of the intrusion. This element of secrecy carries even court-
authorized eavesdropping beyond the traditional limitations upon a proper
search. Search with a warrant involves notice to the individual and affords him
68 Id. at 513.
69 Id. at 513.
70 U.S. CONST. amend IV.
71 Comment, Limitations on Seizure of "Evidentiary" Objects-A Rule in Search of a
Reason, 20 U. CHICAGo L. Rlv. 319 (1953). See also, Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eaves-
dropping Problem: A Professor's View, 44 MINN. L. Rav. 891, 914 (1960).
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an immediate opportunity to protest. Not so the victim of eavesdropping. There
is no notice, the search is continuous and surreptitious.
Unlike the usual search and seizure, a wiretap cannot be specific in its
quest for evidence nor confined to matter relevant to crime. It is an exploratory
dragnet. It is nonselective and indiscriminate as to whom it searches and what
it seizes. As Mr. Justice Brandeis observed in his Olmstead dissent:
Whenever a telephone is tapped, the privacy of the persons
at both ends of the line is invaded and all conversations between
them upon any subject, and although proper, confidential and priv-
ileged, may be overheard. Moreover, the tapping of one man's
telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of every other
person whom he may call or who may call him. As a means of
espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny in-
truments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire-
tapping.
7 2
Mr. Edward Bennett Williams describes one of his experiences as follows:
I received a full exposure to the problems and evils of wire-
tapping in 1956 when I agreed to represent Frank Costello in his
denaturalization case. As we prepared for trial, it became evident
that much of the government's case was built on wiretapped evi-
dence.. . As we delved more deeply into the matter, we discovered
that there had been a tap on Costello's home telephone at inter-
mittent intervals over many years.
During the period of the taps, six policemen sat in eight-hour
shifts, working in teams of two. They listened to and transcribed
every conversation over Costello's telephone, whether he was a
participant or not ....
The transcripts included conversations between Costello and
his wife, his doctor and his lawyer; conversations between Mrs.
Costello and members of her family, her doctor and her friends;
conversations between one of the Costellos' maids and her husband,
baring the most confidential and intimate family secrets . . .
Literally scores of persons who were suspected of no crime and
who had committed no crime were subjected to this kind of sur-
veillance . . .
But the persons victimized by these wiretaps were not just
persons who used Costello's telephone. Taps were placed on public
telephones in restaurants frequented by him. Everyone who used
those pay-station telephones had a hidden third party listening
to every word he said. Confidential business matters between wholly
honest and unsuspecting businessmen were invaded. The tender
words of sweethearts were heard by a third ear . . .
When we talk about wiretapping, it is important to remember
that we are not talking about a wiretap on a particular telephone
to pick up the conversations of a particular man. The Costello taps
picked up a hundred conversations of other people for every one
to which Costello was a party. There is just no way to circumscribe
the number of innocent victims of any tap.
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The use of microphones and other nonwiretapping devices is even more
suspect. As the late Judge Jerome Frank once wrote:
72 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475-76 (1928).
73 Williams, One Man's Freedom 107 (1962).
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A dictaphone, by its very nature, conducts an exploratory
search for evidence of a house-owner's guilt. Such exploratory
searches for evidence are forbidden, with or without warrant, by
the Fourth Amendment.... A search warrant must describe the
things to be seized, and those things can be only (1) instrumentalities
of the crime or (b) contraband. Speech can be neither. A listening
to all talk inside a house has only one purpose - evidence-gathering.
No valid warrant for such listening or for the installation of a
dictaphone could be issued. Such conduct is lawless, an unconstitu-
tional violation of the owner's privacy.74
On the other hand, Mr. Justice Murphy, one of the strongest advocates
of bringing eavesdropping within the fourth amendment believed that:
A warrant can be devised which would permit the use of a
detectaphone.... And, while a search warrant, with its procedural
safeguards has generally been regarded as prerequisite to the reason-
ableness of a search in those areas of essential privacy, such as the
home, to which the Fourth Amendment applies.., some method of
responsible administrative supervision could be evolved for the use
of the 'detectaphone which, like the valid search warrant, would
adequately protect the privacy of the individual against irresponsible
and indiscriminate intrusions by Government officers....
While the detectaphone is primarily used to obtain evidence,
and while such use appears to be condemned by the rulings of this
Court . . . I am not prepared to say that this purpose necessarily
makes all detectaphone "searches" unreasonable, no matter what the
circumstances, or the procedural safeguards employed.7"
Assuming that eavesdropping and wiretapping are brought within the
fourth amendment but, in keeping with technological change, some searches
and seizures are reasonable, legislation would still be needed. The courts alone
would be unequal to the task. First of all, the fourth amendment does not apply
to searches by private persons." Surely, the pestilential practice of eavesdrop-
ping by private persons should be prohibited. Moreover, searches are permitted
in connection with any offense. Eavesdropping, if authorized at all, should be
limited to a few offenses of major importance. Finally, a federal search warrant
may be applied for by any law enforcement officer and issued by a United
States Commissioner. Persons authorized to apply for a warrant should be limited
in number and court approval should be required.
The course legislation should take has been debated for many years. There
is a consensus that Section 605 is inadequate whether one is in favor of a com-
plete and effective banning of all wiretapping or whether he favors the view that
limited tapping should be authorized. The impotency of Section 605 is due, in
part, to the vagueness and ambiguity of such terms as "sender," "intercept" and
"divulge" which have permitted the Department of Justice to take the position
that mere interception is not a crime, nor is interdepartmental disclosure. The
rights of the states regarding wiretapping remain uncertain.
Unquestionably, Congress has the power to legislate comprehensively in-
sofar as wiretapping is concerned. As the Attorney General has said:
74 United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 313 n. 17 (2d Cir. 1951).
75 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 140 n. 7 (1942).
76 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
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A national telephone system requires a national policy. It is
the responsibility of Congress to protect the integrity of the inter-
state telephone network and the privacy of its users. Hence, we
believe Congress should define the conditions by which any wire-
tapping by federal or state officials will be permitted.
7
With respect to other forms of eavesdropping, neither the rules of trespass
nor the concept of "an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area"
afford meaningful guides for adjusting the interest of society in apprehending
lawbreakers and the rights of the individual to privacy. Furthermore, rapid
developments in the techniques of electronic detection and amplification of
sound indicate that soon almost every significant invasion of privacy may be
just as effective without as with a technical trespass.
The powers of Congress to legislate regarding electronic eavesdropping are
less clear cut, but the constitutional questions are sufficiently open to reasonable
dispute to justify legislation. When the conversation is that of a speaker on a
telephone whose words are intercepted by a microphone, as in Goldman and
Silverman, the interception may clearly be regulated. Also, under its primary
authority over radio waves, Congress could control eavesdropping by radio trans-
mitter which would get at the most common and the most efficient means of
electronic eavesdropping now in use. Furthermore, in view of Mapp v. Ohio,"'
section five of the fourteenth amendment may support legislation. Prohibiting
the shipment of electronic eavesdropping devices in interstate commerce would
be another means of regulation as would the taxing power.
The arguments of those in favor of a complete and total banning of eaves-
dropping are essentially the same as those urged in support of the opinion that
the techniques fall under the fourth amendment and no reasonable search and
seizure are possible. They start with the assumption that eavesdropping is an in-
vasion of privacy that cannot be controlled within permissible limits. This view
seems persuasive insofar as electronic eavesdropping is concerned. If eavesdrop-
ping were authorized, even under stringent controls, a person's life would be
subject to complete surveillance without his knowing it. Surely liberty is worth
the price of allowing some criminals to go unapprehended when the alterna-
tive posed by legalizing eavesdropping would make everyone vulnerable to such
an intolerable invasion of his privacy. Judge Jerome Frank expressed this feel-
ing as follows:
[I] believe that, under the Amendment, the "sanctity of a man's
house and the privacies of life" still remain protected from the
uninvited intrusion of physical means by which words within the
house are secretly communicated to a person on the outside. A man
can still control a small part of his environment, his house; he can
retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the knowledge that they
cannot get at him without disobeying the Constitution. That is still a
sizable hunk of liberty - worth protecting from encroachment. A
sane, decent, civilized society must provide some such oasis, some
77 Statement of the Honorable Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General of the United States,
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives, in Support of
H.R.10185, 87th Congress, Second Session, May 22, 1962.
78 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
PROPOSALS - ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING
shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave,
some inviolate place which is a man's castle.79
Wiretapping raises a more difficult problem. Here, as opposed to the situa-
tion in eavesdropping, the criminal is using a modem scientific development
to make himself a more effective lawbreaker. To deny the police the right to
wiretap enables the criminal to exploit the development of modem electronic
communications while denying society the right effectively to counter this use.
I wish I could say that all wiretapping should be outlawed. Perhaps such
a view is unrealistic and sentimental and a carefully controlled system can be
justified, but surely only by great necessity and the burden of establishing this
necessity must be upon the proponents.
How necessary is wiretapping to law enforcement? Virtually every prose-
cutor in a large urban area believes it vital and that a great number of crimes
would go unpunished if wiretapping were not utilized. The Attorney General
has called for limited wiretapping legislation as necessary to protect the na-
tional security and to implement the federal effort to combat organized crime.
On the other hand, there are some distinguished dissenters from this view.
Senator Thomas C. Hennings Jr., whose Constitutional Rights subcommittee
made an exhaustive study of the subject, says the verdict as to need is "not
proven."
I wish to emphasize a tentative conclusion. Both as to the cries
from 'the law officers of one state (New York) for federal permis-
sion to maintain state and local wire tapping and as to the interest
in legislation to authorize wiretapping by federal officers, I think
judgment on the alleged need in each area resembles a Scotch
verdict: not proven. 0
Other opponents concede that wiretapping helps the police but believe the price
is not worth paying. Thomas McBride, former Attorney General of Pennsylvania
and Justice of the State Supreme Court, told the Hennings subcommittee that
tapping does not catch enough criminals to outweigh the loss of "the feeling
of freedom that people have that they are not being listened to."'" Surely, in
order to judge whether wiretapping should be authorized we ought to know
more about its social cost. Nor can the question of necessity be resolved simply
by the testimony of law enforcement officers as to usefulness. That wiretapping
is useful to the police seems obvious. But, in the cases in which it is successfully
used, is it the only investigative technique available? Is an equally efficient
method of detection available? Would the crime go undetected without the
wiretap? Can it be detected at greater expense? 2
Another argument of those who favor official wiretapping is that, under
modem conditions, respect for privacy is insufficient as an exclusive basis for
policy. Society and the individual himself have interests aside from privacy,
and one of them is protection from crime. This position was strongly asserted
by Mr. Justice Sutherland dissenting in the first Nardone case:
79 United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315 (2d Cir. 1951).
80 Hennings, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Legislator's View, 44 MINN.
L. REv. 813, 833 (1960).
81 Id. at 824.
82 Paulsen, Book Review: The Eavesdroppers, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 636, 637 (1960).
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My abhorrence of the odious practices of the town gossip, the
Peeping Tom, and the private eavesdropper is quite as strong as that
of any of my brethren. But to put the sworn officers of the law, en-
gaged in the detection and apprehension of organized gangs of crim-
inals, in the same category, is to lose all sense of proportion. In view
of the safeguards against abuse of power furnished by the order
of the Attorney General, and in the light of the deadly conflict
constantly being waged between the forces of law and order and
the desperate criminals who infest the land, we well may pause to
consider whether the application of the rule which forbids an in-
vasion of the privacy of telephone communications is not being
carried in the present case to a point where the necessity of public
protection against crime is being submerged by an overflow of
sentimentality.8 3
Legislation committing this nation to a policy of limited wiretapping
should be adopted only after careful study and investigation. To accommodate
the conflicting claims of society in law enforcement and the individual in his
privacy, such legislation should, at a minimum, (1) specify a limited number
of situations in which wiretapping will be permitted, (2) prescribe definite and
restrictive procedures for obtaining permission to wiretap, and (3) impose ef-
fective sanctions upon unauthorized wiretapping.84
Of the many bills introduced in Congress in this area, the one sponsored
by the Department of Justice and introduced in the Second Session of the 87th
Congress, is by far the best.85 At the outset there is a general criticism. The bill
does not treat electronic eavesdropping in general but is limited to wiretapping.
As indicated, Congress has the power to legislate in this field and electronic
eavesdropping should be outlawed completely. One practical reason for this
position is that the police may side-step wiretapping laws by switching more
and more to electronic eavesdropping equipment.
Section 5 of the bill establishes procedures authorizing certain interceptions
by law enforcement officers. Subsection (a) empowers the Attorney General
to permit the Federal Bureau of Investigation to tap wires if in his discretion
he determines there is reasonable ground for belief that certain crimes affecting
the national security - espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, subversive activi-
ties, unauthorized disclosure of atomic energy information, or conspiracy to
commit any such offense - have been, are being, or are about to be com-
mitted. In order to proceed under this subsection, the Attorney General must
find and certify there is reasonable ground for belief that the commission of such
an offense presents a serious threat to the security of the United States; that
facts concerning that offense may be obtained through such interception; that
obtaining a court order would be prejudicial to the national interest; and that
no other means are readily available for obtaining the information.
Section 5 (b) empowers the Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney
General of the Department of Justice specially designated by the Attorney
General, to authorize application to a federal judge for a wiretap order and
83 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 387 (1937).
84 Donnelly, Comments and Caveats on the Wire Tapping Controversy, 63 YALE L.J.
799, 807 (1954).
85 See H.R. 10185, S.2813, 87th Congress, 2d Session (1962).
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confers upon the judge authority to issue an order permitting the FBI or any
federal agency having investigative responsibility for the crimes set forth in
the subsection to intercept wire communications in cases involving the security
offenses enumerated in subsection (a), or involving murder, kidnaping, extor-
tion, bribery, transmission of gambling information, travel or trasportation in
aid of racketeering enterprises, narcotics, and any conspiracy to commit any of
these offenses.
Section 5 (c) provides that the Attorney General of any state or the princi-
pal prosecuting attorney for any political subdivsion thereof, if authorized to
do so by state statute, may petition a state judge for leave to wiretap for the
crimes of murder, kidnaping, extortion, bribery, dealing in narcotic drugs or
marihuana or any conspiracy involving these offenses. 6 The bill thus leaves
it entirely up to each state to decide whether it wants to authorize wiretapping or
to ban it entirely. If a state wishes to authorize wiretapping the bill imposes
limits beyond which it cannot go. Congress occupies the field.
Section 8 sets out procedures for applications for, and issuance of, court
orders on both the federal and state levels. Each application for a court order
must be in writing, under oath, and must contain a full and complete statement
of the facts relied on to show probable cause, the location and nature of the
telephone facilities involved, and information concerning all previous wire-
tapping applications involving the same telephone or the same person. The judge
may require additional evidence in support of the application. The judge may
then issue an ex parte order to tap a telephone within the territorial jurisdiction
of his court if he finds probable cause for belief that: an offense for which such
an application is filed is being, has been, or is about to be committed; facts
concerning that offense may be obtained through such interception; no other
means are readily available for obtaining that information; and the facilities
from which communications are to be intercepted are being used or about to
be used in connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased to,
listed in the name of, or commonly used by, a person who has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit such offense.
Section 8 also requires that each court order specify the location of the
facility; each offense as to which information is sought; the investigative agency
involved; and the period of time during which the tap is authorized. Taps may
continue for no more than 45 days and may thereafter be renewed only upon
further application and findings for periods of not more than 20 days.
86 The exclusion of gambling may seem strange. The Attorney General gives this ex-
planation: Many state prosecutors feel that the states should be authorized to tap
wires for gambling offenses also. They are entirely correct in saying that
gambling is central to the problem of organized crime. On the other hand,
to permit tapping the wires of every two-dollar bettor would be to permit
very extensive wiretapping. We have thought it best to limit the authority
to tap wires for gambling to those offenses which involve interstate trans-
mission of gambling information, in the thought that this would be sufficient
to reach the large organized operators.
Statement of The Honorable Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General of the United States,
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I have several reservations about sections 5 and 8 of the bill. The list of
national security offenses where wiretapping would be permitted includes sedition
and subversive activities. Both of these offenses affect the political process and
are fraught with danger to freedom of speech. This difficulty is aggravated when
police officers are empowered to pursue subversive talk on the privacy of the
telephone. When it comes to these offenses many of the previously discussed
objections to wiretapping operate in their most acute form. Evanescent or impul-
sive antigovernment remarks taken out of context can easily be made to sound
more subversive than their true import. The conspiracy dragnet is at its widest.
Political organizations, both left and right, and the amorphous group called
fellow travelers become targets of surveillance.8"
Next, there are alternative procedures for cases involving national security.
When the Attorney General finds that the commission of such an offense presents
a serious threat to the security of the United States, and that obtaining a court
order would be prejudicial to the national interest, he is given the executive
authority to issue the order himself. This unusual procedure is justified in terms
of the sensitivity of the information involved and the danger of leaks if the court
procedure is used. It is also argued that in some instances speed is essential and
the time consumed in obtaining a court order might result in the loss of im-
portant evidence. The forebodings of "leaks" through the judiciary is not sup-
ported by actual experience under the New York law, where wiretapping is
permitted pursuant to an ex parte court order. It should also be noted that
Section 8 (h) requires that all applications made to a federal or state court
and all orders granted by such courts be sealed and they may only be made
public by order of the court or as provided for in the act. If there are instances
where there is not time to obtain a court order a procedure similar to the New
York "hot pursuit" provision might be adopted.8 8 While a warrant is normally
required in New York a law enforcement officer may eavesdrop without a
warrant when he has reasonable grounds to believe (1) that evidence of crime
may be thus obtained, and (2) that in order to obtain such evidence time
does not permit an application to be made for a court order before the eaves-
dropping must commence. If he does so an application for a court order must
be made within twenty-four hours after the eavesdropping commences. If there
is not time to obtain a court order the Attorney General could authorize the
tap as the bill provides but within twenty-four hours thereafter make applica-
tion for a court order.
In connection with the issuance of an executive order the Attorney General
must have "reasonable ground for belief" whereas a judge before he may
enter an order, must make a finding of "probable cause." Do these terms mean
the same or is the Attorney General held to a lower quantum of proof? If wire-
tapping is brought within the fourth amendment it is doubtful whether any
executive warrant would be constitutional in this context. Even so, a finding
of probable cause would surely be required.
87 Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wiretapping, 103 U. PA. L. Rlv. 157,
160 (1954).
88 N.Y. CODE CRIm. PRao. § 813-b (1958).
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Both the executive order and the court order are authorized when an
offense "is about to be committed." In other words, a wiretap order may be
issued not only to detect crime but to prevent it. Such an authorization for in-
vasion of privacy is unknown in the case of a search warrant.8 9 An officer
cannot, under the fourth amendment, obtain a warrant to prevent crime or to
search premises because a crime is "about to be committed."
Finally, the Attorney General or the judge must find that "no other means
are readily available for obtaining such information." The "readily available"
standard is very weak. It sounds as if wiretapping is to be permitted whenever
it is the most convenient method of investigation. In Great Britain one of the
prerequisites for obtaining a warrant is that "normal methods of investigation
must have been tried and failed, or must, from the nature of things, be un-
likely to succeed if tried."9 This is a more meaningful standard.
Section 8(f) provides that before the contents of an intercepted communi-
cation may be introduced in evidence in a federal criminal trial the defendant,
not less than 10 days before trial, must be served with a copy of the court order
or other authorization for the wiretap. Under Section 8 (g) a defendant in a
federal criminal trial may move to suppress the use as evidence the contents
of any intercepted communication or evidence derived therefrom on the grounds
that: the communication was unlawfully intercepted; the order or other
authorization was invalid; there was no probable cause for issuance of the court
order; or the interception was not made in conformity with the order or other
authorization.
All authorized taps should be recorded. Neither the prosecution nor the
defense should have to rely solely upon the agent's recollection of the content
of intercepted messages. Moreover, since recordings can be easily and un-
detectably edited and altered, legislation should assure the integrity of the
recording. This could be done by requiring the original recordings to be sealed
until returned to the custody of the authorizing agency.
Where intercepted communications are to be introduced in a criminal
trial, defense counsel should have access in reasonable terms to the original
recordings. Section 8 (f) should be amended to permit this. Furthermore,
the section applies only when the contents of the intercepted wire communi-
cation are to be offered in evidence. It is apparently inapplicable when the
evidence to be offered is derived from the wiretap. Since the motion to suppress
includes derivative evidence it would seem that Section 8 (f) should also apply
when the government plans to offer derivative evidence. Another reason for
this suggested change is that under existing law the defendant has the burden
of proving that a wiretap in fact took place.9 Frequently this is most difficult.
The defendant may be completely unaware that his telephone had been tapped.
Circumstantial evidence of tapping is insufficient. Although some federal courts
seem to place a heavier burden upon the defendant than others, generally the
motion for a hearing must request suppression of specific evidence. If the de-
89 PAULSEN AND KADISH, Criminal Law and its Processes 397-98, fn. qq (1962).
90 DAsH, KNOWLTON AND SCHWARTZ, The Eavesdroppers 289 (1959).
91 61 YALE L.J. 1221 (1952).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
fendant is successful in establishing the fact of the wiretap, the burden shifts
to the prosecution to show that the evidence to be presented had an origin
independent of the wiretap.
Section 8 (g) apparently permits a defendant to move to suppress wiretap
evidence even though he was not a party to the intercepted communication. This
is a desirable change in existing law. In Goldstein v. United States,92 the Court,
after referring to the cases denying standing to one not the victim of an un-
constitutional search and seizure to object to the introduction in evidence of
that which was seized, said:
A fortiori the same rule should apply to the introduction of evidence
induced by the use of disclosure thereof to a witness other than the
victim ...
We think no broader sanction should be imposed upon the Govern-
ment in respect of violations of the Communications Act.93
The dissenting justices took the position that it is immaterial, considering the
purposes to be served by Section 605 of the Communications Act, whether
objection is made by the one sending the communication or by another who
is prejudiced by its use.
The rule that evidence obtained by a violation of § 605 is in-
admissible is not a remedy for the sender; it is the obedient answer
to the Congressional command that society shall not be plagued
with such practices as wire-tapping.9
Other sections of the bill should be mentioned briefly. Section 3 provides
that it shall be a felony, punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or im-
prisonment for not more than two years or both, for a person willfully to inter-
cept, disclose or use the contents of any wire communication except as specifically
authorized by the Act. Section 4 provides that no part of the contents of an
unlawfully intercepted wire communication and no evidence derived therefrom
may be received in evidence in any judicial, administrative, legislative or other
proceeding of the United States, or of any State or any political subdivision
thereof. The only exception is that if the wiretap was lawfully authorized,
then evidence obtained from it may be admitted in a federal or state court in
a criminal proceeding, or before a federal or state grand jury.
Section 9 requires copies of all of the applications made and orders issued
under the Act to be transmitted to the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts and to the Department of Justice. The Administrative Office is
instructed to report annually to the Congress.
CONCLUSION
All responsible citizens must be acutely aware of threats to the national
security and the cancerous growth of organized crime. There is a danger,
however, of losing perspective. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter once said:
Loose talk about war against crime too easily infuses the ad-
ministration of justice with the psychology and morals of war. It
92 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
93 Id. at 121.
94 Id. at 127.
